National Law School of India Review
Volume 20

Issue 1

Article 5

2008

Special and Differential Treatment in International Trade: A
Developing Country Perspective
A. Jayagovind

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.nls.ac.in/nlsir

Recommended Citation
Jayagovind, A. (2008) "Special and Differential Treatment in International Trade: A Developing Country
Perspective," National Law School of India Review: Vol. 20: Iss. 1, Article 5.
Available at: https://repository.nls.ac.in/nlsir/vol20/iss1/5

This Notes and Comments is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in National Law School of India Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship Repository.
For more information, please contact library@nls.ac.in.

SPECIAL AND DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT IN
INTERNATIONAL TRADE:

A

DEVELOPING COUNTRY PERSPECTIVE
Dr. A. Jayagovind'

This article traces the policy of, and the history behind, "Special and Differential
Treatment" (S&DT) accordedto thedevelopingcountriesin thefield ofinternational
trade. Within its broad canvas, the Article looks at the framezork of GATT, the
WTO, modern day MultilateralAgreements and recent political face-offs as
exemplified in the Doha Negotiations.The Article argues that there has been a
drastic change in the terms of S & DT and the attitude ofdeveloping countries.
Ironically, this reveals a role reversalwhere developed countrieshave been defacto
demandingfor S&DT while it is the developing countries who are assertingthe
binding natureof internationalobligations.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The international economic order that was established after World War II
aimed at promoting free trade among nations. The doctrinal basis of this order was
Keynesian Economics which emphasised government intervention to remedy
hardships caused by the operation of market forces.' The notion of a self-correcting
and self-operating equilibrium achieved by a balance of forces in a rational universe
was decisively rejected by the new international economic order, which was put in

Vice Chancellor, National Law School of India University, Bangalore,
JM. Keynes, THE THEORY OF MiONEY AND THE FOREIGN EXCHANGES (1924).
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place by the end of the 1940s. This thinking was favourable to the aspirations of
developing countries as well. Both, the reconstruction of European economies
devastated by the War and the development of developing economies, had a place in
the ideology of the international instruments? Though these two issues were
qualitatively different, the emphasis on productivity and employment was welcome
to developing countries.
When the United Nations Organisation (UNO) launched the negotiations for
the establishment of International Trade Organisation (ITO), a large number of
developing countries actively participated in the negotiations, and the Havana
Charter of 1948 articulated the idea of a partnership between developed and
developing countries to achieve the integrated development of global economy. This
spirit was reflected in Article 8 which read:

The Members recognise that the productive use of world's human and
material resources is of concern to and will benefit all countries, and
the indlustrial and general development of all countries, particularly of
those in which resources are as yet relatively undeveloped, as well as
the reconstruction of those whose economies have been devastated by
war, will improve the opportunities for employment, enhance the
productivity of labour, increase the demand for goods and services,
contribute to economic balance, expand international trade and raise
the levels of real income.

Though most of the provisions of the Charter were hortatory in nature, the
document as a whole struck a balance between the concerns of developed and
developing countries. The special concerns of developing countries, such as falling
prices of primary commodities, were specifically addressed. But at the end of the

2

President Roosevelt initiated a series of New Economic Policies actively intervening in
the market to fight the Great Depression in the 1930's. International Economic
Institutions, established at the end of the Second World War such as the IMF and the
GATT have carried forward that legacy to the international sphere.
IBRD, popularly known as the World Bank, was conceived to fulfil the aims of both

reconstruction and development. This is evident in its title itself - the International Bank
for Reconstruction and Development. The Havana Charter also referred to these goals
in several places.
The United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment, held in Havana, Cuba, in
1947, adopted the Havana Charter for the International Trade Organization which was

meant to establish a multilateral trade organization. For various reasons, the charter
never came into force; available at, http://www.wto.org/english/docs e/legal 4e
havana e.pdf (last visited 25 March 2008).
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day, it was realised that the Havana Charter was "too good to be true".' It was
unceremoniously jettisoned and only Chapter IV of the Charter, by name
"Commercial Policy", was adopted with modifications. These modifications
debilitated the spirit of partnership between developed and developing countries.
The modified version came to be known as the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT).6
The strategy of reciprocal trade liberalisation envisaged by the GATT was
based on the idea of equality among nations,' and to that extent it failed to appreciate
the economic vulnerability of developing countries. The result was that international
trade liberalisation bypassed the goods which were of interest to developing
countries.' Hence, developing countries became increasingly disenchanted with the
concept of free trade embodied in the GATT and started demanding special and
differential treatment (S&DT).

IL S&DT

TREATMENT

Conceptually, S &DT can take the following four forms:
l1

Coordinated measures between developed and developing countries which
positively help the latter.

2.

Exemptions for developing countries from a general rule so as to provide them
with some autonomous policy space.

3.

Imposition of comparatively lesser obligations on developing countries taking
into account their relatively weaker position.

4.

Provision of a relatively longer period of time to developing countries to comply
with the general obligations.

For an elaborate treatment of the historical developments in this regard, see R. GARDNER,
6

a

SuRLING- DOLLAR DILOMAcy, 356-3701(1956).
To bring the GATT into force quickly, a Protocol of Provisional Application was developed.
The GATT 1947 Agreement was brought into the Uruguay Round agreements by GATT
1994; available at http://wwwwtoorg/english/does-e/legal e/gatt47_e.pdf (last visited 25
March 2008).
"The GATT canonizes, canalizes and controls reciprocal trade liberalization" See J.
JACKS0NWoRLDTRADE AND1I ELAW OF GATT, 193-201 (1969).
For the detailed analysis of the concept of inequality in international trade, see GUNNAR
MYRDAL, EcoNoNUC THEORY AND UNDFRDFVELOPED ReGioNs (1971).
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The coordinated measures envisaged under (1) imply the transfer of resources
from developed to developing countries. In the context of international trade,
international commodity agreements and Generalized System of Preferences are
examples of this coordinated approach. In the present state of international relations,
where there is insufficient community spirit, it is very difficult to implement this
type of measure. Article XVIII of the GATIT, an example of the second type of special
treatment, provides for a special regime for developing countries to manage their
balance of payments problems and to promote industrialisation. The Agreement on
Agriculture' and the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures0 forming
part of the WTO Agreement are good examples for the third kind of special treatment;
for they impose lesser obligation on developing countries. The Agreement on Traderelated Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, permitting developing countries to
avail a longer period of time to comply with the obligations under the agreement,
illustrates the fourth type of special treatment."

HI. GATT

AND

S&DT TREATMENT

In the course of the evolution of the GATT, three significant measures were
taken to give effect to the S&DTconcept. They were, first, the amendment to Article
XVIII of the GATT, secondly, the incorporation of Part IV and lastly, the adoption of
the Enabling Clause in 1979.1
In 1957, Article XVIII of the GATT was amended to include Sections B, C and
D.11 The provisions of Section B allowed developing countries to apply quantitative
restrictions more liberally than developed countries could, to meet their balance of
payments problems. Section B provisions were liberally used by most of the
developing countries and for all practical purposes these provisions exempted
developing countries from free trade obligations during the GATT period. Sections C
and D enabled developing countries to pursue infant industry protection policies.

9

Available at, www.wto.org/english/docse/legal-e/14-ag.pdf (last visited 25 March 2008)
o Available at, http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/24-scm-01_e.htm (last visited 25
March 2008).

1

The TRIPS Agreement provides for transition periods, permitting developing countries
additional time to bring national legislation and practices into conformity with TRIPS
provisions; available at www.wto org/english/tratop-e/trips..e/tripste.htm (last visited
25 March 2008).
See generally, Martin Wolf, Differentialand More Favorable Treatment of Developing Countries
and the International Trading System 1(4) Woan BANK Eco. REV. 647 (1987).
H. H. Liebhafsky Tn Yar5 of GATT 25(1) SouTHERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL 74 (1958).
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In 1966, Part IV, titled'Trade and Development' was added to the CATT, and it
contained three articles: XXXVI, XXXVII & XXXVII. 14 Essentially, this was an effort
to convert the various proposals canvassed in United Nations Conference on Trade
and Development (UNCTAD) into hard law. But as it often happens in the case of
international legal instruments, the long-winded sentences used camouflaged the
absence of action with the actual appearance of action. The only definitive obligation
which it contained was in Part IV, para.8 of Article XXXVI:
The developed countries do not expect reciprocity for commitments
made by them in trade negotiations to reduce or remove tariffs and
other barriers to trade of less developed contracting parties.
This Article clarified that the clause "do not expect reciprocity" meant that
the less developed countries should not be expected to undertake obligations
inconsistent with their individual development, financial and trade needs, taking
into consideration past trade developments.
The principle of non-reciprocity adumbrated above paved the way for the
Generalized System of Preferences (GSP). 5 This proposal for GSP was articulated in
the UNCTAD-II held in 1968. In 1970 the U.S.A., the European Countries, Japan, and
Canada agreed to give tariff preferences to certain products from developing
countries'16 To get over the legal hurdle of the most favoured nation treatment, the
waiver under Article XXV: 5 was granted for ten years. But when this period of ten
years was about to end, the Contracting Parties took a very important Decision,
known as the Enabling Clause." This provided for Differential and Most Favourable
Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing countries, and a
permanent basis for the granting of preferences in favour of developing countries."
The above Decision was the third hard law measure under the GATT. As the
title indicated, the Decision sought to provide more favourable treatment to
developing countries to ensure their fuller participation in international trade. Para.1
of this Decision stated:
"

Note, Free Trade and Preferential Tariffs: The Evolution of International Trade Regulation in

GATT and UNCTAD, 81(8) HARV. L.REv. 1806 (1968).
John Whalley, Non-DiscriminatoryDiscrimination:Special and DifferentialTreatment Under the
GATT for Developing Countries, 100 Eco. J. 1318 (1990).

'Waiver Decision on the Generalized System of Preferences, June 25, 1971, GATT B.1S.D.
(18th Supp.) at 24 (1972).
" See, L. Bartels, The WTO Enabling Clause and Positive Conditionality in the European
Community's GSP Program, 6 J. Int'l Econ. L. 507, 512 (2003).
1 Decision on Differential and More Favourable Treatment Reciprocity and Fuller
Participation of Developing Countries, November 28, 1979 (L/4903) available at http://

www vto.org/english/docs-e/legale/enablingl979_e.htrn (last visited 25 March 2008).
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Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 1 of the General Agreement,
Contracting parties may accord differential and more favourable
treatment to developing countries without according such treatment
to other contracting parties.
Thereafter, the expression S&DT became firmly embedded in International
Trade Law.
As pointed out above, preferences and international commodity agreements
represent the coordinated approach towards S&DT. The UNCTAD led by its first
Secretary General Raul Prebisch articulated these proposals powerfully. The GATT
accepted the idea of preferences in principle, and quite a few international commodity
agreements were concluded outside the GAIT framework. Both the ideas, preferences
and commodity agreements, continue to be in operation in diluted forms today.
However, they have become so diluted that they hardly help the developing countries
in solving their problems. According to a study commissioned by the International
Labour Organization, between 1980 and 2000, the world prices for 18 commodities
fell by an average of 25% in real terms. The structure and scope of international
commodity agreements are too weak and too limited to do anything in this regard. 9
Preferences do not cover the items which are of interest to developing countries."
Raul Prebisch and a British economist Prof. Singer demonstrated that terms
of trade have been moving against developing countries, based on data collected in
the period between 1870 and 1930. The Prebisch-Singer thesis, as it was popularly
known, provided a theoretical framework for the policy of import substitution
followed by most of the developing countries until the 1990s. 2 1 These countries focused
on the mobilisation of internal resources through planned economic development.
From an international institutional point of view, what these countries required
was the freedom to pursue an autonomous policy of development while keeping
external contacts alive. In other words, despite heavy internal orientation, most
developing countries wanted to engage in international trade. The GATT framework
as reflected in amended Article XVIII served this purpose.
The policy of planned economic development focusing on import substitution
helped the developing countries in the initial stages to consolidate their political and
economic independence." But in the course of time, this policy proved to be
GwoBAuzxrnoN: CREKxNc OPPORTUNmIES FOR ALL 375 (2004).
T.N. Srinivasan, Emerging Issues in World Trading System, in DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN WORLD
TRADING SYSTEM 32-38 (Edward Elgar ed., 2002).
See, J.A OcMpo, THE TERMS OF TRADE FOR COMMODrES INTHE TWENTIETH CNTURY (2003).
See generally Bela Balassa, Trade Policy in Developing Countries, 61 TeL AMERIcAN EcoNoarbc

" ILO, A FAIR
2

2
2

Review 178 (1971).
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counterproductive. In the absence of competition, efficiency decreased, and in the
absence of efficient production, equity became a mirage? By the beginning of the
1980s, there was a general realisation that both, efficiency and equity, could be better
realised in an open economy, guided by market considerations. Cutting across
ideological and other barriers, many countries started adopting market-friendly
policies both internally and externally; and it was in this context that the Uruguay
Round negotiations were launched. The World Trade Organisation (WTO) was the
product of neo-liberal economic philosophy widely prevalent in the 1980s and 1990s.

IV. SPECIAL

AND DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT UNDER THE

WTO

The Punta del Este Declaration provided that the developing countries would
not be expected to make concessions inconsistent with their development, financial
and trade needs. But when the agreement was reduced into writing, this assurance
was confined only to least developed countries (LDCs) Article XI: 2 of the Framework
Agreement that established the WTO, and two accompanying Decisions explicitly
stated this point.
The WTO divides its members into 3 groups: developed, developing and the
least developed countries. The position occupied by the developing countries under
the GATT is now confined to the LDCs among them. In a couple of cases, e.g. the
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (ASCM), even the LDCs are
subjected to certain obligations. 4
There are 97 places in the WTfO Agreement wherein the S&DT is provided.
They may be broadly grouped under five heads:
1.

lower level of obligations;

2.

more flexible implementation time table;

3.

best endeavour commitments by developed countries;

4.

technical assistance and training;

5.

more favourable treatment for LDCs.

23

24

Anne 0. Krueger, Trade Policy as an Input to Development, 70 THE AmmucAx EcoNoMic REviEw
288 (1980).
The Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures ("SCM Agreement")
addresses two separate but closely related topics: multilateral disciplines regulating
the provision of subsidies, and the use of countervailing measures to offset injury
caused by subsidized imports. See, http://wwwwto.org/english/tratope/scm-e/
subs e.htm (last visited 25 March 2008).
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The Agreement on Agriculture (AOA), the Agreement on Subsides and
Countervailing Measures (ASCR) and the Agreement on Safeguards are three
important agreements where the developing countries are subjected to lower level
of obligations. Under the AOA, the developed countries are expected to reduce tariffs
on agricultural commodities by 36% over a period of six years? For the developing
countries, the commitment is 24% over a period of ten years? 6 Similar principles are
applicable to aggregate measures of support and export subsidies, Under the ASCM,
there are special de minimis rules for imposing countervailing measures for subsidised
imports from developing countries. Part VIII of the Agreement is titled 'Special and
Differential Treatment' and provides for time periods and standards that are specific
to developing countries. Both, under the Agreement on Safeguards and the Agreement
on Anti-dumping, the action against a developing country cannot be initiated unless
its overall share of imports exceeds particular limits.
The Agreement on Trade-related aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)
is a very good example of the flexible implementation of commitments. It allows
developing countries a transition period of five years to comply with obligations in
the agreement, while developed countries have to comply with them within one
year from the commencement of the Agreement.
In a number of places, Best Endeavour and Technical Assistance commitments
by developed countries are provided? The LDCs are by and large exempt from all
the obligations. The ASCM is perhaps the one place where even the LDCs are subject
to certain obligations, though they are much lower than the obligations imposed on
developed and developing countries.
A comparison of S&DT in the WTO and the GATT shows a positive attitude of
developing countries towards international economic relations. As was pointed out
earlier, under the GAIT regime, the developing countries used S&DT to look inward,
and pursue their own closed-door policies. The drastic change in the attitude of

" See generally Will Martins et al., eds., The Uruguay Round and the Developing Economies,
World Bank Discussion Papers No. 307, 1995, at 128.
26 Id.
27

See for instance, Article 67 of the TRIPs Agreement - "Technical Cooperation: In order
to facilitate the implementation of this Agreement, developed country Members shall
provide, on request and on mutually agreed terms and conditions, technical and financial
cooperation in favour of developing and least-developed country Members. Such
cooperation shall include assistance in the preparation of laws and regulations on the
protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights as well as on the prevention
of their abuse, and shall include support regarding the establishment or reinforcement
of domestic offices and agencies relevant to these matters, including the training of
personnel"
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developing countries since the 1980s isreflected in the WTO as well. They now want
to participate meaningfully in international commerce, and their demands are now
couched in terms of level playing field. The new multilateral trade agreements (MTAs)
such as the TRIPS, TRIMS, GATS, DSUetc, demonstrate this change in the perception.
These agreements are equally applicable to all the countries (with the exception of
LDCs) with some flexibility regarding the time factor.

V. DOHA DEVELOPMENT ROUND
Neo-liberalism reached its peak in the mid-1990s with the establishment of
the WTO. Market-based reforms yielded some positive results initially. But soon
the reform process both at national and international levels was faced with
roadblocks. Within the WTO, it was reflected in the increasing disenchantment of
developing countries with the WTO mechanism.
In the course of the negotiations in the Uruguay Round, the developed countries
had used the liberalisation of trade in agricultural commodities and textiles as a
bargaining tool to persuade developing countries to accept the obligations in new
areas such as the TRIPs.? In practice however, the proposed benefits did not
materialise, even though the developing countries were implementing the agreements
in good faith and to the best of their ability. The Agreement on Textiles set back
liberalisation such that the tangible benefits developing countries received were
greatly delayed. In agriculture, the developed countries had been dragging their feet,
even while fulfilling the obligations they had undertaken. Even today, powerful
countries like the U.S.A. have not honoured the rulings of the WTO, especially in the
area of subsidies.29
In the Ministerial meeting held at Doha in 2001, the developing countries voiced
their frustration with the existing system and called for a new initiative to tackle the
problems of development. It was noteworthy that the demands were no longer
couched in terms of supplication. They were more in nature of assertions that the
developed countries must comply with their obligations. Paragraph 2 of the Doha
Declaration reads:

2

AMR[A NARLIKAR, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: BARGAINING COALITIONS IN THE
AND WTO (2003).
See generally, U.S. Non Compliance with WTO Rulings, EUROPEAN UNION FACTSIIE available at
http://ec.europa.eu/external relations/us/sum06 04/fact/wto.pdf (last visited 25 March

GATT

9

2008).
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The majority of WTO members are developing countries. We seek to
place their needs and interests at the heart of the Work Programme
adopted in the Declaration... In this context, enhanced market access,
balanced rules and well-targeted and sustainably framed technical
assistance and capacity building programmes have an important role
to play."
The Doha Declaration mandated that the negotiations had to conclude by 1
January, 2005 and the Ministerial meetings which took place in between had to take
stock of the progress and give appropriate directions. But in reality, the deadline
was missed several times and the deliberations are still continuing.
The AOA appears to be the most intractable issue dividing the developed and
developing coun tries and even here the domestic subsides to farmers appears to be
the bone of contention." Surprisingly, in this highly charged controversy, the
meaning of S&DT has totally changed, and developed countries are now demanding
special treatment exempting them from the blatant violation of the rules which they
had laid down after elaborate negotiations. As it is, the AOA was tilted in favour of

developed countries since it exempts income support subsidies (resorted to by the
western developed countries) while banning price support subsidies (used by the
developing countries). Both the U.S.A. and the EC resort to box shifting, i.e., amber
box subsidies are shown as either blue box or green box subsidies. When the
developing countries point out that the huge subsidies, under whatever box they
are provided, will distort international trade, the developed countries stonewall on
the issue. As an illustration, the U.S.A. has not yet complied with the adverse WTO
ruling in the Brazil- Upland Cotton case.1
It may be noted that historically when it came to agriculture, the richest
countries received all the S&DT they demanded. In the 1950s, the U.S.A. sought a
waiver from its obligations to liberalise agricultural trade and as a result, agriculture
was pushed out of the GATT agenda. The same thing is recurring. With the expiry of
the Peace Clause at the end of 2004, all subsidies including export subsidies are
actionable under the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. From
this point of view, the AOA is already dead. It would be best for the international

trading system if this fact is acknowledged soon.
Available at, http://www.wto.org/English/thewtoe/ministe/min0le/mindecl-e.htm (last
visited 25 March 2008).
F. JAWARA, BEHIND THE SCENES AI TE WTO (2003).
See, WTO Compliance Panel Report on Brazil's Complaint concerning US Subsidies on
Upland Cotton; available at, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dispu e/cases e/

ds267_e.htm (last visited 25 March 2008).
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Another interesting development pertaining to Doha Round is the Doha
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health. The developing countries
were reluctant to surrender their autonomy concerning the appropriate domestic
IPR regime. Among other things, theneoliberal ideology finally led them to agree on
the TRIPS. By 2000, they realised that tightening the IPR regime in developing
countries would undermine their public health system. However, the solution was
sought through the mechanism of IPRs. Paragraph 5(b) of the Doha Declaration
read:
Each member has the right to grant compulsory licences and the freedom
to determine the grounds upon which such licences are granted.
Each member has the right to determine what constitutes a national
emergency, it being understood that public health crises, including those
relating to HIV/AIDs, tuberculosis, malaria and other epidemics, can
represent a national emergency
This is an assertion of the right to issue compulsory licences. It was suggested
that the countries which do not have the capability to produce certain drugs
internally may issue compulsory licences to an enterprise outside its jurisdiction to
manufacture those drugs and supply them exclusively to the country concerned.
Though the Doha Declaration on Public Health created a certain uneasiness
among the developed countries, the U.S.A. found it convenient when it was faced
with the anthrax problem. Though cross licensing has not yet taken place, the
Declaration has found widespread acceptance. Similarly there have been a number
of other international issues concerning various MTAs. But the solution is sought
within the framework of existing agreements.

VI.

CONCLUSION

It is well-accepted in law and philosophy that the principle of equality can be
applied only among equals. A priori, it follows that some special and favourable
treatment should be extended to the relatively weaker sections of the society,
nationally and internationally. This principle supplies the rationale for special and
differential treatment (S&DT) for developing countries within the international arena.
The international trade liberalisation movement cannot afford to ignore the interests
of developing countries and their just demands. The acceptance of this principle in
international trade however, has more to do with political reasons than any
philosophical justifications. Most of the time, S&DT has enabled the developing
countries to continue with their autonomy regarding policy space while enjoying
the benefits of an open multilateral trading system. However, very rarely has there

been S&DT in the sense of coordinated efforts to help developing countries positively.
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In recent times with the ubiquity of the neo-liberalism mantra, and with the
advent of the WTO, S&DT has lost much of its significance as far as developing
countries are concerned. Ironically, in the case of the present impasse in the WTO,
the roles seem to have been reversed. In a sense, it is the developed countries which
have been demanding for S&DT on issues like AOA while the developing countries
oppose this, using the language of international obligations. This represents not just
a hypocritical stand by the developed countries, but also in a way symbolises the
coming of age of the developing world.
A little scepticism is certainly in order when considering the huge differences,

both socio-economic and political, that still must be surmounted. We will certainly
lose substantial gains if trade negotiations were to faiL But we will also survive,
hopefully stronger from the experience. Much still needs to be said in favour of 'free'
trade; at the very least, it must however at least be 'fair'. The history of S&DTs and
the various shades the issue has taken lends us a unique perspective to analyse and
understand this trend.
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